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THE FINAL COUNTDOWN: CALIFORNIA PUBLIC EMPLOYEES’ 
RETIREMENT SYSTEM v. ANZ SECURITIES AND THE SWEEPING 
BAN ON TOLLING STATUTES OF 
REPOSE IN CLASS ACTIONS 
EMILY KELSAY* 
[Jamie] Dimon, the chief executive of JP Morgan Chase . . . had 
spent part of the prior evening at an emergency, all-hands-on-
deck meeting at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York with a 
dozen of his rival Wall Street CEOs.  Their assignment was to 
come up with a plan to save Lehman Brothers, the nation’s 
fourth-largest investment bank—or risk the collateral damage 
that might ensue in the markets.  
 . . . . 
  . . . Saturday’s papers prominently featured the dramatic news 
to which he had alluded.  Leaning against the kitchen counter, 
Dimon opened the Wall Street Journal and read the headline of 
its lead story: “Lehman Races Clock; Crisis Spreads.” 
 Dimon knew that Lehman Brothers might not make it through 
the weekend. . . .  In the next twenty-four hours, Dimon knew, 
Lehman would either be rescued or ruined.1 
In September 2008, Lehman Brothers Holdings (“Lehman Brothers”) 
declared bankruptcy in a move that “reshape[d] the landscape of American 
finance.”2  In the last year of its life, Lehman Brothers used public securi-
ties offerings in an attempt to raise capital and increase its liquidity.3  The 
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 1.  ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL 1–2 (2011 ed.). 
 2.  Andrew Ross Sorkin, Lehman Files for Bankruptcy; Merrill Is Sold, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
14, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/15/business/15lehman.html. 
 3.  Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. ANZ Secs., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 2042, 2047–48 (2017). 
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Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) requires that a company 
making a public security offering register the security and disclose im-
portant financial information.4  The registration statements must include: 
“[a] description of the company’s properties and business; [a] description of 
the security to be offered for sale; [i]nformation about the management of 
the company; and [a] [f]inancial statement certified by independent ac-
countants.”5 
When Lehman Brothers made its public offerings in 2007 and 2008, its 
registration statements—prepared by underwriters6 from a variety of finan-
cial firms—contained allegedly falsified information regarding its account-
ing practices and risk management procedures.7  Under Section 11 of the 
Securities Act of 1933 (“Section 11”), plaintiffs can bring an action against 
underwriters of a security registration statement if the statement contains a 
misstatement or omission of a material fact.8  Claims made under Section 
11 are subject, however, to the limitations of action provision codified in 
Section 13 of the Securities Act of 1933 (“Section 13”), which requires that 
a plaintiff bring the action within one year of discovering the falsity or 
within three years of the security’s public offering.9 
In June 2008, a retirement fund that bought some of the relevant Leh-
man Brothers securities offerings filed a class action in the Southern Dis-
trict of New York against a variety of underwriters who had prepared the 
securities’ registration statements.10  The class action sought to impose lia-
bility on the underwriters under Section 11.11  Though it was not a named 
plaintiff, California Public Employees’ Retirement System (“CalPERS”) 
was a member of the class action in New York.12  But in February 2011, the 
district court still had not certified the class action.13 
CalPERS decided to take matters into its own hands and filed its own 
suit against the underwriters in the Northern District of California on Feb-
                                                          
 4.  Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answersregis33htm.html (last modified Sept. 2, 2011). 
 5.  Id.  
 6.  In the securities context, an underwriter is either a person or an entity, commonly an in-
vestment bank, that “guarantees the sale of newly issued securities by purchasing all or part of the 
shares for resale to the public.”  Underwriter, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 7.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Moody Inv’rs Serv., 
Inc., 137 S. Ct. 2042 (2017) (No. 16-373).  
 8.  Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2016). 
 9.  Securities Act of 1933 § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (2016).  
 10.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 137 S. Ct. 2042 (No. 16-
373). 
 11.  Id.  
 12.  Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 137 S. Ct. at 2048.  
 13.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 137 S. Ct. 2042 (No. 16-
373). 
  
1142 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 77:1140 
 
ruary 7, 2011.14  The claims alleged by CalPERS in its individual suit were 
identical to those Section 11 violations alleged in the New York class ac-
tion.15  CalPERS’s individual action was transferred to the Southern District 
of New York and consolidated with the class action shortly after its filing.16  
Later that year, the class action reached a settlement, and the district court 
certified the class so the settlement could move forward.17  When CalPERS 
received notice of the class action settlement (CalPERS was still a member 
of the class even though it was also pursuing an individual action), it decid-
ed to opt out of the settlement to continue to pursue its own individual 
claims.18 
Unfortunately for CalPERS, the district court dismissed its individual 
suit as untimely filed under Section 13 of the Securities Act of 1933, be-
cause the action was initiated in February 2011—more than three years af-
ter the public offerings.19  The United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal in 2016.20  Ultimately, the 
United States Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit’s ruling and held 
that the action was untimely because the three-year time bar in Section 13 is 
a statute of repose that cannot be tolled21 while a class action is pending.22 
This Comment first examines the legal history of both the Securities 
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the doctrine of 
tolling statutory time bars in class actions.23  This Comment then examines 
the path and analysis of CalPERS’s claims in both the Second Circuit and 
the Supreme Court.24  Next, this Comment analyzes the Supreme Court’s 
holding in California Public Employees’ Retirement System v. ANZ Securi-
                                                          
 14.  Id.  
 15.  Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 137 S. Ct. at 2048. 
 16.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4–5, Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 137 S. Ct. 2042 (No. 16-
373). 
 17.  Id. at 5. 
 18.  Id.  
 19.  Id.  
 20.  See In re Lehman Bros. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 655 F. App’x 13, 16 (2d Cir. 2016), aff’d 
sub nom. Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. ANZ Secs., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 2042 (2017). 
 21.  The principle of “tolling” a statutory time bar pauses the timeliness requirement.  When a 
time bar is tolled in circumstances where a suit was filed first in one court and then filed again in 
another court (as is frequently the case with class action claims), the limitations period “does not 
run while the litigation is pending” in the first court.  Equitable Tolling, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  In this case, CalPERS argued that the filing of the original class 
action in the Southern District of New York paused—or tolled—the three-year time bar in Section 
13, and that the limitations period should not have resumed running until after the New York class 
was certified.  Brief for Petitioner at 8–9, Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. ANZ Secs. Inc., 137 S. Ct. 
2042 (2017) (No. 16-373). 
 22.  Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 137 S. Ct. at 2055. 
 23.  See infra Part I.A–C. 
 24.  See infra Part I.D. 
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ties, Inc.25 and concludes the holding was correct.26  Following this conclu-
sion, this Comment argues that the Supreme Court’s holding in California 
Public Employees’ Retirement System v. ANZ Securities, Inc. should be ap-
plied broadly to all statutes of repose.27 
I.  BACKGROUND 
This Part will discuss the legislative history of Section 13 of the Secu-
rities Act of 1933 and the development of the equitable tolling principle as 
it relates to class action lawsuits.28  First, it will examine the original Secu-
rities Act of 1933 and its subsequent modifications in the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934.29  Next, it will give a brief overview of American Pipe 
& Construction Co. v. Utah30 and the tolling principle that case introduced 
for class action lawsuits.31  Third, it will examine the circuit split that has 
developed since American Pipe regarding whether the tolling principle set 
forth in that case applies to statutes of repose—in particular, the repose pe-
riod codified in Section 13 of the Securities Act of 1933.32  Finally, it will 
summarize California Public Employees’ Retirement System v. ANZ Securi-
ties,33 its procedural background, and the Supreme Court’s reasoning in de-
ciding that American Pipe equitable tolling does not apply to the Section 13 
statute of repose.34 
A.  The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
and the History and Construction of Section 13 
In 1932, the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency began an ex-
pansive investigation into the “practices with respect to the buying and sell-
ing and the borrowing and lending of listed securities upon the various 
stock exchanges.”35  At the directive of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the 
Committee was tasked with creating legislation to avoid the “unregulated 
speculation in securities” that led to the stock market crash of 1929 and the 
events thereafter.36  In 1933, Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933 
                                                          
 25.  137 S. Ct. 2042 (2017). 
 26.  See infra Part II.A. 
 27.  See infra Part II.B–C. 
 28.  See infra Part I. 
 29.  See infra Part I.A. 
 30.  414 U.S. 538 (1974).  
 31.  See infra Part I.B. 
 32.  See infra Part I.C. 
 33.  137 S. Ct. 2042 (2017).  
 34.  See infra Part I.D. 
 35.  S. REP. NO. 73-1455, at 1 (1934). 
 36.  S. REP. NO. 73-792, at 2 (1934) (quoting Letter from Franklin D. Roosevelt, President, 
U.S., to Duncan V. Fletcher, Chairman, Senate Banking & Currency Comm. (Mar. 26, 1934)). 
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regulating the sale of securities to the public with the intention to “provide 
full and fair disclosure of the character of securities sold . . . and to prevent 
frauds in the sale thereof.”37  The Act is still used for the safety of investors 
and to ensure that companies that issue securities offerings include all in-
formation a buyer would need to make a fully informed purchase.38 
Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 provided a cause of action al-
lowing individuals or companies that purchased securities offered with false 
registration information to seek legal remedy from various parties, includ-
ing from underwriters.39  Additionally, Section 13 of the Act contained a 
“Limitation of Actions” provision that applied to claims brought under Sec-
tion 11.40  In 1933, Section 13 provided: 
No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created un-
der section 11 . . . unless brought within two years after the dis-
covery of the untrue statement or the omission, or after such dis-
covery should have been made by the exercise of reasonable 
diligence . . . .  In no event shall any such action be brought to en-
force a liability created under section 11 . . . more than ten years 
after the security was bona fide offered to the public.41 
While a large portion of the Securities Act of 1933 remains unchanged 
in its current form, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 modified Sec-
tion 13 merely a year later.42  The 1934 Act amended Section 13 by chang-
ing the “two years” provision to “one year” and the “ten years” provision to 
“three years.”43  Notably, this amendment significantly shortened the period 
of time after which the Act would completely bar a potential plaintiff from 
                                                          
 37.  Securities Act of 1933, ch.38, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 77a–77aa (2016)). 
 38.  See Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus. Pension Fund, 135 S. Ct. 
1318, 1323 (2015) (quoting Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 646 (1988)); id. (stating that Section 11 
of the Securities Act of 1933 “promotes compliance with these disclosure provisions by giving 
purchasers a right of action . . . for material misstatements or omissions in registration state-
ments”). 
 39.  Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38 § 11, 48 Stat. 74, 82–83 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77k (2016)).   
 40.  Id. § 13, at 84.  Section 13 also applies to claims brought under Section 12 of the Securi-
ties Act of 1933, which is not relevant to this Comment’s analysis.  See 15 U.S.C. § 77l. 
 41.  Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38 § 13, 48 Stat. 74, 84 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77m).  
 42.  Compare id. (“No action shall be maintained . . . unless brought within two years after 
the discovery . . . .  In no event shall any such action be brought . . . more than ten years after the 
security was bona fide offered to the public.”), with Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, sec. 
207, § 13, 48 Stat. 881, 908 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77m) (“Section 13 of such Act is 
amended (a) by striking out ‘two years’ wherever it appears therein and inserting in lieu thereof 
‘one year’; (b) by striking out ‘ten years’ and inserting in lieu thereof ‘three years’ . . . .”). 
 43.  Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, sec. 207, § 13, 48 Stat. 881, 908 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77m). 
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bringing a Section 11 claim.44  When the Securities Act of 1933 was codi-
fied, Section 13 incorporated the one-year and three-year time bars from the 
amended Securities Exchange Act of 1934.45 
The dual time bar contained in Section 13 gives rise to a common fea-
ture of statutory time limits: the pairing of a statute of limitations with a 
statute of repose.46  Statutes of limitations and statutes of repose begin to 
run at different points in time and are aimed at achieving different purpos-
es.47  With a statute of limitations, the clock starts ticking when the claim 
accrues, meaning “when the injury occurred or was discovered.”48  Statutes 
of limitations are intended to encourage plaintiffs to “pursue ‘diligent pros-
ecution of known claims.’”49  In contrast, with a statute of repose, the clock 
begins ticking immediately from the “date of the last culpable act or omis-
sion of the defendant.”50  Because the running of a statute of repose is not 
contingent on whether the injury has been discovered, it serves as a “cutoff” 
of a defendant’s liability.51  Since the three-year provision in Section 13 is 
measured from when the security is offered (that is, the last culpable act of 
the defendant), and uses the phrase “[i]n no event shall any such action be 
brought,”52 courts have construed the provision as a statute of repose.53 
B.  American Pipe and the Principle of Equitable Tolling in Class 
Actions 
In 1974, the United States Supreme Court issued a landmark opinion 
in American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah54 on the interaction between 
                                                          
 44.  For the significance of this change, see infra Part II.A.  
 45.  Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–aa.  When codified in the United States Code, 
this provision retained the name “Securities Act of 1933,” although it included the amended provi-
sions from the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  As a result, this Comment will refer to the Act as 
the “Securities Act of 1933,” but will continue to reference the one- and three-year time bars.  
 46.  See Gabelli v. SEC, 568 U.S. 442, 453 (2013) (“[S]tatutes applying a discovery rule . . . 
often couple that rule with an absolute provision for repose . . . .”); see also Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. 
Sys. v. ANZ Secs., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 2042, 2045 (2017) (“The pairing of a shorter statute of limita-
tions and a longer statute of repose is a common feature of statutory time limits.”).  
 47.  CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175, 2182 (2014).  
 48.  Id. (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1546 (9th ed. 2009)). 
 49.  Id. at 2183 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1546 (9th ed. 2009)). 
 50.  Id. at 2182.  
 51.  Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 363 (1991). 
 52.  Securities Act of 1933 § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (2012).  
 53.  See Lampf, 501 U.S. at 363 (referring to the three-year provision in Section 13 as a “peri-
od of repose,” and stating its purpose is “clearly to serve as a cutoff”); P. Stoltz Family P’ship v. 
Daum, 355 F.3d 92, 96 (2d Cir. 2004) (stating that claims brought under Section 12 of the Securi-
ties Act face a three-year “statute of repose”); Caviness v. Derand Res. Corp., 983 F.2d 1295, 
1300 (4th Cir. 1993) (stating that the three-year limitation in Section 13 is a statute of repose, and 
that the language “allows for no qualification”).  
 54.  414 U.S. 538 (1974).  
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statutes of limitations and class actions under Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 23 (“FRCP 23”).55  Under FRCP 23, one or more members of a quali-
fying class may sue one or more defendants on behalf of a group of similar-
ly situated plaintiffs.56  However, in order for a class action to be 
maintained, the class must be certified by a court.57  While FRCP 23 in-
structs that a court should certify a class “[a]t an early practicable time,”58 
the certification process is not always efficient, and a class may not be certi-
fied before the statute of limitations or statute of repose for filing an indi-
vidual action expires.59 
In American Pipe, the State of Utah filed a class action against Ameri-
can Pipe & Construction Co. (“American Pipe”) for violations of federal 
antitrust law.60  The class action was filed eleven days before the statute of 
limitations expired.61  Six months later, the United States District Court for 
the Central District of California granted American Pipe’s motion claiming 
that the suit could not be certified as a class action,62 because the class was 
not “so numerous” under FRCP 23(a)(1).63 
Eight days after class status was denied, numerous members of the 
would-be class filed motions to intervene as plaintiffs in the action, but the 
district court denied all motions as untimely.64  The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and found that the would-be class 
members’ actions were commenced by the State of Utah’s filing, and there-
fore were not in violation of the statute of limitations.65  The Supreme Court 
affirmed that the statute of limitations was tolled66 while the class action 
was still pending.67  As a result, because Utah filed the class action eleven 
                                                          
 55.  Id. at 540.  
 56.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
 57.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c). 
 58.  Id. 23 (c)(1)(A). 
 59.  See STEFAN BOETTRICH & SVETLANA STARYKH, NERA ECON. CONSULTING, RECENT 
TRENDS IN SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: 2016 FULL-YEAR REVIEW 23 (2017), 
http://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/2017/PUB_2016_Securities_Year-
End_Trends_Report_0117.pdf (finding that in thirty-six percent of securities class actions filed 
and resolved from 2000 through 2016, it took courts three years or longer to hand down a decision 
on class certification). 
 60.  American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 541.  The specific claims litigated in American Pipe are not 
relevant to this Comment. 
 61.  Id. at 541–42. 
 62.  Id. at 542–43. 
 63.  According to FRCP 23: “One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as such 
representative parties on behalf of all members only if: the class is so numerous that joinder of all 
members is impracticable . . . .”  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1).  
 64.  American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 543–44.  
 65.  Id. at 545.  
 66.  See supra note 21 (defining tolling and its application in class actions). 
 67.  American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 561. 
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days before the statute of limitations expired, the individual plaintiffs had 
eleven days from the time the class was denied to file their own motions be-
fore the time bar expired.68  Therefore, because the members’ motions after 
the class denial were filed only eight days after class status was denied, the 
filings complied with the statute of limitations.69 
This case gave rise to an equitable principle known as “American Pipe 
tolling.”  This principle establishes that while class action certification is 
pending, the statute of limitations is tolled for subsequent actions by indi-
vidual class members from the time the class action is filed until certifica-
tion is either denied or granted.70  It is an equitable principle, not a legal 
one, because the Court based its decision in American Pipe on its “judicial 
power to toll statutes of limitation in federal courts.”71  Because this form of 
tolling was created by the judiciary and not by the legislature, “[e]quitable 
tolling is not permissible where it is inconsistent with the text of the rele-
vant statute.”72  Since American Pipe established an equitable principle that 
originally applied to a statute of limitations, courts have been divided when 
analyzing whether American Pipe tolling can also apply to statutes of re-
pose.73 
C.  The Resulting Circuit Split on the Application of American Pipe 
Tolling to the Statute of Repose in Section 13 of the Securities Act 
of 1933 
Multiple United States Courts of Appeals, including the Second, Sixth, 
and Tenth Circuits,74 have analyzed whether American Pipe tolling applies 
to Section 13 of the Securities Act of 1933.75  As different circuits came to 
different conclusions, a circuit split emerged. 
                                                          
 68.  Id.  
 69.  Id.   
 70.  See id. at 554 (“[T]he commencement of a class action suspends the applicable statute of 
limitations as to all asserted members of the class . . . .”). 
 71.  Id. at 558. 
 72.  United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 48 (1998) (citing United States v. Brockamp, 519 
U.S. 347 (1997)). 
 73.  See infra Part I.C. 
 74.  See Stein v. Regions Morgan Keegan Select High Income Fund, Inc., 821 F.3d 780, 794–
95 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that the Section 13 statute of repose could not be tolled); Police & Fire 
Ret. Sys. of Detroit v. IndyMac MBS, Inc., 721 F.3d 95, 101 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that the Sec-
tion 13 statute of repose could not be tolled); Joseph v. Wiles, 223 F.3d 1155, 1168 (10th Cir. 
2000) (holding that the Section 13 statute of repose was subject to tolling). 
 75.  Other Courts of Appeals have also analyzed whether American Pipe tolling applies to 
statutes of repose other than the one in Section 13 of the Securities Act, including statutes of re-
pose in other securities statutes, but those fall outside the scope of this Part of this Comment.  See, 
e.g., Dusek v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 832 F.3d 1243 (11th Cir. 2016) (finding that claims 
brought under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 20(a) are subject to a time bar similar to that 
in § 13, and American Pipe tolling is inapplicable to the statute of repose). 
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The Tenth Circuit was the first to decide the issue in Joseph v. Wiles76 
in 2000.  In Joseph, the relevant public offerings were made in May 1987, 
and multiple class actions were filed against the defendants in 1989 and 
1990.77  The class actions, of which Mr. Joseph was a member, alleged, in-
ter alia, violations under Section 11 of the Securities Act.78  Mr. Joseph 
filed his own action alleging violations of Section 11 in August 1990, three 
months after the three-year statute of repose expired.79  He asserted that the 
statute of repose was tolled by the other class actions filed in 1989, which 
also alleged Section 11 violations.80  The Tenth Circuit held that because 
the other Section 11 class action claims against the defendants were timely 
filed, and because Mr. Joseph was a member of those classes, the statute of 
repose was tolled,81 and his suit was timely.82  The Tenth Circuit is the only 
circuit to have held that American Pipe tolling can apply to the three-year 
Section 13 time bar.83 
In 2013, the Second Circuit took up the issue in Police & Fire Retire-
ment System of Detroit v. IndyMac MBS, Inc.84  In that case, the Police and 
Fire Retirement System of the City of Detroit (“Detroit PFRS”) and the 
Wyoming State Treasurer and the Wyoming Retirement System (collective-
ly “Wyoming”) each filed class actions alleging claims against IndyMac for 
violations of multiple provisions of the Securities Act of 1933, including 
violations of Section 11.85  The two class actions were subsequently consol-
idated, with Wyoming as the lead plaintiff.86  After the actions were consol-
idated, the district court dismissed the entire action on the grounds that Wy-
oming, the only named plaintiff, lacked standing.87  Detroit PFRS and other 
members of the class filed motions to intervene to assert their Section 11 
                                                          
 76.  223 F.3d 1155 (10th Cir. 2000). 
 77.  Id. at 1157. 
 78.  Id.  
 79.  Id. at 1166. 
 80.  Id.  
 81.  The Tenth Circuit in this case characterized American Pipe tolling as “legal” tolling ra-
ther than “equitable” tolling.  Id. at 1166–67.  The Tenth Circuit stated that equitable tolling was 
appropriate when a plaintiff had missed a filing deadline due to a mistake in the pleading filed or 
due to opposing counsel’s misconduct.  Id. at 1166.  The court stated that legal tolling occurs 
when “an action is commenced and class certification is pending.”  Id. at 1167.  This Comment 
accepts the argument that American Pipe tolling is properly classified as “equitable” tolling.  See 
infra Part II.A.2.  The debate regarding the distinctions between “legal” and “equitable” tolling in 
the American Pipe decision, however, is outside the scope of this Comment. 
 82.  Joseph, 223 F.3d at 1168. 
 83.  See infra Part I.C (discussing different holdings from the Second Circuit and the Sixth 
Circuit).  
 84.  721 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 85.  Id. at 101–02. 
 86.  Id. at 102.  
 87.  Id. at 103. 
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claims against the defendants.88  After an extensive discussion about the dif-
ferences between statutes of limitations and repose,89 the Second Circuit 
held that American Pipe tolling did not apply to the statute of repose in Sec-
tion 13 of the Securities Act of 1933.90  As a result, Detroit PFRS’s motion 
to intervene in the action was untimely.91 
Most recently in 2016, the Sixth Circuit also took up the issue in Stein 
v. Regions Morgan Keegan Select High Income Fund, Inc.92  In Stein, the 
defendants made their last public offerings in July 2008, and the Stein 
plaintiffs initiated their individual action alleging Section 11 violations in 
October 2013—more than five years after the defendants’ last public offer-
ings.93  The plaintiffs claimed that the pending certification of two other 
class actions filed against the defendants—filed first in 2007 and transferred 
to federal district court in Tennessee in 2009—tolled the statutory time re-
strictions in Section 13.94  After the Sixth Circuit acknowledged the circuit 
split regarding whether the three-year statute of repose could be tolled, it 
went through the analyses from both Joseph and IndyMac, ultimately find-
ing the Second Circuit’s reasoning in IndyMac to be the “more cogent and 
persuasive rule.”95  As a result, the Sixth Circuit also held that American 
Pipe tolling does not apply to the three-year statute of repose in Section 
13.96  After the decisions from the Second, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits, courts 
were fractured regarding the effect American Pipe had on Section 13.97 
D.  The Supreme Court’s Decision in California Public Employees’ 
Retirement System v. ANZ Securities, Inc. That American Pipe 
Tolling Does Not Apply to the Section 13 Statute of Repose 
In California Public Employees’ Retirement System v. ANZ Securities, 
Inc., the Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit’s decision to dismiss 
CalPERS’s individual claim as untimely filed.98  The Court held that be-
cause the three-year time bar enacted in Section 13 of the Securities Act of 
                                                          
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Id. at 106–07 (finding that the three-year bar in Section 13 is a statute of repose). 
 90.  Id. at 109 (“[A]pplication of the [equitable tolling] rule to Section 13’s three-year repose 
period is barred by Lampf, which states that equitable ‘tolling principles do not apply to that peri-
od.’” (quoting Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 363 
(1991))). 
 91.  Id. at 112–13. 
 92.  821 F.3d 780 (6th Cir. 2016). 
 93.  Id. at 792.  
 94.  Id. at 785, 792. 
 95.  Id. at 793. 
 96.  Id. at 794–95. 
 97.  See supra Part I.C. 
 98.  Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. ANZ Secs., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 2042, 2055 (2017). 
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193399 was a statute of repose, the filing of the individual complaint could 
not be tolled by the filing and pending certification of a class action to bring 
it within the time limit.100  The Court held that a statute of repose super-
sedes a court’s equitable power to modify statutory time limits.101  Because 
the American Pipe tolling rule upon which CalPERS relied is grounded in 
that equitable power, the Court held that it could not apply to the three-year 
bar in Section 13.102  As a result, the Court dismissed CalPERS’s individual 
suit against Respondents.103 
1.  Factual Background and the Lower Court’s Holding in In re 
Lehman Brothers Securities & ERISA Litigation 
Before declaring bankruptcy in September 2008, Lehman Brothers 
used public securities offerings to raise capital in 2007 and 2008.104  
CalPERS, the largest public pension fund in the United States, along with 
many other investors, purchased some of these securities.105  Shortly before 
Lehman Brothers announced its bankruptcy filing, a federal putative class 
action regarding the securities they sold was filed on June 18, 2008,106 in 
the Southern District of New York against various financial firms107 (collec-
tively “Respondents”) that served as underwriters in the securities transac-
tions.108  The class was filed “on behalf of all persons who purchased the 
identified securities,” which included CalPERS.109  The class action110 com-
plaint alleged that the underwriting firms violated Section 11 of the Securi-
ties Act of 1933111 by making material misstatements and/or omissions in 
the registration statements for some of Lehman Brothers’ security offer-
ings.112 
                                                          
 99.  Securities Act of 1933 § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (2016). 
 100.  Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 137 S. Ct. at 2055.  
 101.  Id.  
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Id.  
 104.  Id. at 2047–48. 
 105.  Id. at 2047.  
 106.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 137 S. Ct. 2042 (No. 16-
373). 
 107.  A total of twenty-nine firms were named as respondents in this action.  A full list can be 
found in an appendix to the majority opinion.  Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 137 S. Ct. at 2048; see 
also id. at 2055 (providing the full list of the named financial firms).   
 108.  Id. at 2047–48.  
 109.  Id. at 2048.  
 110.  This action was consolidated with other suits alleging securities violations against Leh-
man Brothers in a single, multidistrict suit.  Id.  
 111.  Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2016).  
 112.  Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 137 S. Ct. at 2048.  
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In February 2011, after waiting almost three years for the class action 
in the Southern District of New York to be certified,113 CalPERS filed its 
own federal claim against Respondents in the Northern District of Califor-
nia.114  CalPERS’s complaint alleged the same Section 11 violations as the 
class action, but it was filed only on CalPERS’s own behalf.115  This claim 
was consolidated with the existing multidistrict litigation in New York, but 
shortly after this transfer, the class action reached a settlement.116  CalPERS 
opted out of the class settlement to proceed with its individual claims.117 
After the class action settlement was finalized, Respondents moved to 
dismiss CalPERS’s individual suit, claiming that the action was not filed 
within the three-year time bar enacted by Section 13 of the Securities 
Act.118  CalPERS claimed that the three-year period was tolled while the 
class action certification was pending, so its individual action was still time-
ly filed.119  The district court disagreed and held that the time bar in Section 
13 was not subject to tolling.120  CalPERS then appealed to the Second Cir-
cuit.121 
The Second Circuit primarily analyzed whether the tolling principle 
the Supreme Court announced in American Pipe & Construction Co. v. 
Utah122 applied not only to statutes of limitations but also to statutes of re-
pose.123  Because the Second Circuit found that the three-year bar in Section 
13 was a legislatively enacted statute of repose,124 it found that the statute 
could not be affected by a tolling rule grounded in equity.125  Additionally, 
the Second Circuit rejected CalPERS’s argument that its individual claim 
was “essentially ‘filed’” just because the class action, of which CalPERS 
was a member, was timely filed.126  The Second Circuit found that if an in-
dividual class member’s claims could be “essentially ‘filed’” in the class 
                                                          
 113.  See text accompanying supra notes 13–14. 
 114.  Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 137 S. Ct. at 2048.  
 115.  Id.  
 116.  Id.  
 117.  Id.; see also Brief for Petitioner at 4–5, Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys,. Inc., 137 S. Ct. 2042 
(No. 16-373) (detailing the delay in and subsequent settlement of the class action lawsuit). 
 118.  Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 137 S. Ct. at 2048.  CalPERS brought six individual Section 
11 actions against the Respondents (among other claims not relevant to this Comment), one of 
which was found to be timely and was allowed to proceed.  Brief for Petitioner at 6 n.2, Cal. Pub. 
Emps.’ Ret. Sys,. Inc., 137 S. Ct. 2042 (No. 16-373).  The single timely Section 11 claim resulted 
in settlement.  Id. 
 119.  Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 137 S. Ct. at 2048.  
 120.  Id.  
 121.  Id. 
 122.  414 U.S. 538 (1974).  
 123.  In re Lehman Bros. Secs. & ERISA Litig., 655 F. App’x 13, 14–15 (2d Cir. 2016).  
 124.  See supra Part I.C. 
 125.  In re Lehman Bros., 655 F. App’x at 15. 
 126.  Id.  
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action’s complaint, American Pipe tolling would be irrelevant all togeth-
er.127  The Second Circuit also noted that it had already held in Police & 
Fire Retirement Systems of Detroit v. IndyMac MBS, Inc.128 that Section 13 
was a statute of repose not subject to American Pipe tolling.129  As a result, 
the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision by summary order 
to dismiss CalPERS’s individual action as untimely.130  CalPERS subse-
quently filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which the United States Su-
preme Court granted to consider whether “the filing of a putative class ac-
tion serve[s], under the American Pipe rule, to satisfy the three-year time 
limitation in Section 13 of the Securities Act with respect to the claims of 
putative class members[.]”131 
2.  The Supreme Court’s Reasoning in California Public 
Employees’ Retirement System v. ANZ Securities 
The Supreme Court began by examining the nature and purpose of 
Section 13’s three-year bar.132  Consistent with the Court’s prior hold-
ings,133 the Court found that it was clearly a statute of repose, because the 
three-year limit in Section 13 demonstrated legislative intent to provide de-
fendants with freedom from any suits after a set period of time.134  Further-
more, under CTS Corp. v. Waldburger,135 the Court ruled that the fact that 
the three-year bar begins to run “from the defendant’s last culpable act . . . 
not from the accrual of the claim” is strongly indicative that it is a statute of 
repose.136  Additionally, the Court found that Congress’s shortening of the 
time bar from ten years to three years137 only a year after the Securities Act 
of 1933 was enacted also demonstrated that Section 13 was a statute of re-
pose designed to protect defendants’ financial stability.138 
After reaffirming that Section 13’s three-year bar was a statute of re-
pose, the Court turned to whether the purpose of a statute of repose affects 
                                                          
 127.  Id.  
 128.  721 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2013).  
 129.  In re Lehman Bros., 655 F. App’x at 15; see also supra Part I.C. 
 130.  In re Lehman Bros., 655 F. App’x at 16. 
 131.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Moody Inv’rs Serv 137 
S. Ct. 2042 (2017) (No. 16-373); Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. ANZ Secs., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 811 
(2017) (mem.) (granting certiorari as to question 1). 
 132.  Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., Inc., 137 S. Ct. at 2048–49.  
 133.  See supra Part I.A. 
 134.  Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 137 S. Ct. at 2049–50; see also supra Part I.A.  
 135.  134 S. Ct. 2175 (2014). 
 136.  Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 137 S. Ct. at 2049 (citing CTS Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2182–83).  
 137.  See supra Part I.A. 
 138.  Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 137 S. Ct. at 2050. 
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when tolling rules can apply.139  Because statutes of repose are intended to 
create an absolute bar against liability for defendants, the Court held that 
“[t]olling is permissible only where there is a particular indication that the 
legislature did not intend the statute to provide complete repose.”140  The 
Court found that because the statute of repose in Section 13 was legislative-
ly enacted, its authority outweighed the Courts’ own ability to extend the 
time limit for equitable purposes.141  CalPERS specifically argued that Sec-
tion 13’s three-year bar should be tolled based on the tolling principle the 
Supreme Court recognized in American Pipe.142  However, the Court reject-
ed this argument not only because the applicable time bar in American Pipe 
was a statute of limitations and not of repose, but also because the tolling 
principle derived from equity principles, not from legislative authority.143  
As such, the Court held that the equitable tolling rule from American Pipe 
did not apply to Section 13’s three-year time bar.144 
The Court next addressed CalPERS’s four counterarguments that toll-
ing should apply and dismissed them all in turn.145  First, CalPERS asserted 
that the case at bar was indistinguishable from American Pipe.146  The Court 
quickly rebuffed this claim because the statutory time bar in American Pipe 
was a statute of limitations, not of repose, and it “began to run when ‘the 
cause of action accrued.’”147  Next, CalPERS argued that because the class 
action complaint was timely filed, it fulfilled the timeliness requirements 
for later suits filed by individual class members.148  CalPERS reasoned that 
Respondents had sufficient notice of pending claims against them.149  How-
ever, the Court stated that allowing tolling rules to apply to individual suits 
filed by class action members would contradict the purpose of a statute of 
repose by greatly expanding a defendant’s potential liability.150  Third, 
CalPERS proposed that a dismissal of its individual suit would eliminate its 
right to opt out of a class action.151  The Court responded to this contention 
by stating that opting out of a class action does not provide a plaintiff with 
                                                          
 139.  Id.  
 140.  Id.  
 141.  Id. at 2051.  
 142.  Id.  
 143.  Id.  
 144.  Id. at 2052.  
 145.  Id.  
 146.  Id.  
 147.  Id. at 2052–53 (quoting Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 541 n.2 (1974)). 
 148.  Id. at 2053.  
 149.  Id.  
 150.  Id.  For further discussion on the purpose and classification of statutes of repose, see infra 
Part II.A.  
 151.  Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 137 S. Ct. at 2053.  
  
1154 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 77:1140 
 
the right to disregard statutory time limits.152  Finally, CalPERS argued that 
if the Court failed to apply American Pipe tolling to statutes of repose, the 
result would cause great inefficiency in the courts by burdening them with 
protective filings from class members.153  The Court ruled that, not only did 
it still not have the authority to override the statutory time limit, but there 
was also no evidence there would be an “influx of protective filings.”154 
Alternatively, CalPERS argued that even without applying tolling 
principles, its individual suit was timely filed because the class action 
“brought” CalPERS’s claims within the required time period.155  CalPERS 
contended that “an ‘action’ is ‘brought’ when substantive claims are pre-
sented to any court, rather than when a particular complaint is filed.”156  
However, the Court found that an “action” does not refer to the content of 
its claims but rather to the specific judicial proceeding.157  Even though 
CalPERS’s suit alleged the same claims as the class action, its suit was still 
filed “in a separate forum, on a separate date, by a separate named party.”158  
In fact, contrary to CalPERS’s alternative argument, the Court stated that if 
the proper filing of a class action caused all later individual actions to be 
timely, it would completely defeat the purpose of tolling—a principle the 
Court has described as “necessary.”159  As a result, the Court also dismissed 
CalPERS’s alternative argument.160 
The Court held that Section 13’s three-year time bar is a statute of re-
pose that is designed to protect defendants against future liability after a 
certain period of time has passed.161  The Court further held that this statute 
overcomes a court’s traditional equitable power to alter time limits, and as a 
result the equitable tolling principle from American Pipe cannot extend the 
                                                          
 152.  Id.  
 153.  Id.  
 154.  Id. at 2053–54.  Here, a “protective filing” is an action filed while class action certifica-
tion is pending to ensure that class members will have an alternate judicial remedy if the class is 
not certified.  See id. at 2051 (“[P]otential class members would be induced to file protective mo-
tions to intervene or to join in the event that a class was later found unsuitable . . . .” (quoting Am. 
Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 553–54 (1974))). 
 155.  Id. at 2054.  
 156.  Id.  
 157.  Id. (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 41 (3d ed. 1933)). 
 158.  Id.  
 159.  Id.  The Court cited several examples in its opinion of cases in which it has found that 
equitable tolling is necessary.  See, e.g., Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 350 
(1983) (finding that unless filing a class action tolled statute of limitations, members would not be 
able to rely on the existence of the class action suit to protect their individual rights); Am. Pipe & 
Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 555–56 (1974) (finding that interpreting FRCP 23 as permit-
ting tolling is “necessary to insure effectuation of the purposes” of the Rule). 
 160.  Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 137 S. Ct. at 2054.  
 161.  Id. at 2055. 
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statutory time limit.162  Therefore, CalPERS did not timely file its individual 
action against Respondents, and this untimely filing was grounds for dis-
missal.163 
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Ginsburg stated that CalPERS’s claim 
was timely initiated when the class action under Section 11 was filed.164  
Justice Ginsburg reasoned that because the class action alleged claims iden-
tical to those in the individual action, Respondents had sufficient notice of 
their liability to all class members.165  She found that the filing of the class 
action provided Respondents notice of their liability to the class members 
within the three-year period required by Section 13, and, therefore, the pur-
pose of the statute of repose was fulfilled.166  Justice Ginsburg echoed 
CalPERS’s argument that the majority’s decision would lead to inefficien-
cies in that, after this ruling, defendants would have an incentive to prolong 
discovery, and class members would have an incentive to file protective 
claims in separate complaints.167  As a result, she stated that the majority’s 
decision infringed on class members’ opt-out rights,168 and she would have 
held that CalPERS’s claim was timely filed, reversing the Second Circuit.169 
                                                          
 162.  Id.  
 163.  Id.  
 164.  Id. at 2056 (5-4 decision) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. 
Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 550 (1974)).  
 165.  Id.  
 166.  Id.  This Comment discusses this contention infra at Part II.C. 
 167.  Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 137 S. Ct. at 2058.  In a study conducted by NERA Economic 
Consulting, which examined, in part, securities class action cases filed and resolved from 2000 to 
2016, researchers discovered that thirty percent of class actions took one to two years to gain class 
certification after the filing of the first complaint, and another thirty percent of class actions took 
two to three years to gain class certification.  BOETTRICH & STARYKH, supra note 59, at 23 fig.19.  
When reviewing this study and others of similar nature, one of the amicus briefs supporting the 
petitioner pointed out that the time it takes for a class to be certified along with the median time it 
takes for a class action to settle (three years) support the allegation that individual class members 
will have significant incentives to file either motions to intervene or individual complaints in order 
to protect their individual claims from being barred by the repose period.  Brief of Retired Federal 
Judges as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 9–10, Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 137 S. Ct. 
2042 (No. 16-373).   
 168.  Justice Ginsburg drew a comparison to Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, which states, 
“[i]n the context of a class action predominantly for money damages . . . [the] absence of notice 
and opt out violates due process.”  564 U.S. 338, 363 (2011) (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. 
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985)).  Justice Ginsburg used this case to support her argument that 
without filing additional protective claims within the repose period, class members could poten-
tially lose their “constitutionally shielded right to opt out of the class.”  Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 
137 S. Ct. at 2057 (5-4 decision) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
 169.  Id. at 2058.  
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II.  ANALYSIS 
The Supreme Court in California Public Employees’ Retirement Sys-
tem v. ANZ Securities, Inc. was correct in holding that American Pipe toll-
ing does not apply to the statute of repose in Section 13 of the Securities 
Act of 1933, because that statute’s legislative history indicates that Con-
gress intended the three-year provision to be an absolute bar on defendants’ 
liability.170  This holding can be read broadly as applying to all statutes of 
repose or narrowly as only applying to the statute of repose in Section 13.171  
But because statutes of repose provide defendants with a substantive right 
to be free from future liability after a specific period of time, the Court’s 
holding should be read broadly.172 
This Part will first examine why the Supreme Court was correct in 
finding that the statute of repose in Section 13 was not subject to American 
Pipe tolling.173  Next, this Part will argue that the Court’s holding should be 
read broadly as applying to all statutes of repose, because statutes of repose 
provide defendants with a substantive right that cannot be infringed upon by 
judicially enacted tolling.174  Third, this Part will examine the counterargu-
ment that this holding should be read narrowly as only applying to Sec-
tion 13, ultimately finding that a narrow reading is not the legally correct 
conclusion.175 
A. The Supreme Court Was Correct in Holding That American Pipe 
Tolling Does Not Apply to the Statute of Repose in Section 13 of the 
Securities Act of 1933. 
Section 13 of the Securities Act of 1933 contains clear, decisive lan-
guage to indicate that Congress did not intend for claims to be brought un-
der this provision after three years.176  Congress’s failure to carve out an ex-
ception illustrates its underlying intent to create an absolute bar; thus, the 
Supreme Court was correct in holding that American Pipe tolling does not 
apply to the statute of repose in Section 13.177 
1.  The Clear Language and Lack of Exception Contained in 
Section 13 Support the Finding That the Legislative Intent of the 
                                                          
 170.  See infra Part II.A. 
 171.  Compare infra Part II.B, with infra Part II.C. 
 172.  See infra Part II.B. 
 173.  See infra Part II.A. 
 174.  See infra Part II.B. 
 175.  See infra Part II.C. 
 176.  See supra Part I.A.; see also infra Part II.A.1–2. 
 177.  See supra Part I.A.; see also infra Part II.A.1–2. 
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Three-Year Provision Was to Completely Absolve Defendants of 
Future Liability 
“In no event shall any such action be brought to enforce liability . . . 
more than three years after the security was bona fide offered to the pub-
lic . . . .”178  The message of this provision is clear: plaintiffs cannot bring a 
claim more than three years after a defendant places a security on the mar-
ket, no matter what.179  The plain meaning rule in statutory interpretation 
provides that “where the language of a statute is plain, the sole role of the 
courts is to enforce it according to its terms.”180  The Court in California 
Public Employees’ Retirement Systems did exactly that.181  Additionally, the 
Court made a point to note that Section 13 did not contain an express ex-
ception, which would have indicated intent on the part of the legislature to 
modify the absolute statutory restriction.182 
The Court used the language of the statute and its lack of exception to 
support the conclusion that Congress intended the three-year bar in Sec-
tion 13 of the Securities Act of 1933 to be an absolute bar to a defendant’s 
future liability.183  The legislative history of Section 13 also bolsters this 
conclusion.184  Merely a year after the Securities Act of 1933 was enacted, 
Congress dramatically changed the length of the statute of repose in Sec-
tion 13 from ten years to three years.185  This significant shortening of the 
time during which a plaintiff can bring an action under Section 13 suggests 
that Congress intended for defendants to have greater freedom from liability 
than provided under the original statute.186 Comparing the current version of 
                                                          
 178.  Securities Act of 1933 § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (2016) (emphasis added). 
 179.  See 2 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 7:61, 
Westlaw (database updated Oct. 2017) (“[T]he generally accepted rule is that the three-year re-
pose period is unconditional and therefore is not tolled . . . .”).  
 180.  LARRY M. EIG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-589 STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 41 (2011), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-589.pdf; 
see, e.g., Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 475–76 (1992) (adhering to the 
plain meaning of Section 33(g) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act and 
stating, “[t]he controlling principle in this case is the basic and unexceptional rule that courts must 
give effect to the clear meaning of statutes as written”). 
 181.  Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. ANZ Secs., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 2042, 2049 (2017) (“The statute 
provides in clear terms that ‘[i]n no event’ shall an action be brought more than three years after 
the securities offering on which it is based.  This instruction admits of no exception and on its face 
creates a fixed bar against future liability.” (citation omitted)). 
 182.  Id. at 2050. 
 183.  Id.  
 184.  See supra Part I.A. 
 185.  Compare Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 13, 48 Stat. 74, 84 (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. § 77m (2016)), with Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, sec. 207, § 13, 48 Stat. 881, 
908 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77m (2016)). 
 186.  Cal. Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys., 137 S. Ct. at 2050 (“The evident design of the shortened statu-
tory period was to protect defendants’ financial security in fast-changing markets by reducing the 
open period for potential liability.”). 
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a statute with the language of its previous iterations best reflects the goals 
of Congress when enacting a statute.187  Based on the legislative history, 
coupled with the content of the statute itself, the Court correctly determined 
that the purpose of the statute of repose in Section 13 was to absolve de-
fendants of future liability under this provision, without exception, after 
three years.188 
2.  Because American Pipe Tolling Was Created by the Equitable 
Powers of the Court, It Cannot Outweigh Clear Statutory Intent 
That a Statute Should Have No Exceptions After a Specified 
Time Period 
As discussed in Part I of this Comment, American Pipe & Construc-
tion Co. v. Utah189 created a tolling principle in which statutes of limitations 
can be tolled while a class action certification is pending.190  The Court in 
American Pipe specifically stated that it based its tolling mechanism on its 
“judicial power to toll statutes of limitation.”191  This judicial power is an 
equitable one—courts use it when adhering to the absolute legal rule would 
cause an unfair hardship.192  But there are limits on a court’s equitable pow-
er, and in articulating when a statutory time limitation can be tolled, the 
American Pipe Court stated that the correct test is “whether tolling the limi-
tation in a given context is consonant with the legislative scheme.”193 
The language of the American Pipe Court itself admits that if tolling a 
time limitation would be inconsistent with the statute’s legislative history, 
tolling would not be appropriate.194  The legislative history of Section 13 of 
the Securities Act of 1933195 indicates that it is the very type of statute to 
which application of American Pipe tolling would be inappropriate.196  
Congress intended that the three-year statute of repose in Section 13 be sub-
ject to no exception.197  As a result, the Court in California Public Employ-
ees’ Retirement Systems correctly held that American Pipe tolling does not 
apply to the statute of repose in Section 13 of the Securities Act of 1933.198 
                                                          
 187.  See EIG, supra note 180, at 44. 
 188.  See supra Part I.A. 
 189.  414 U.S. 538 (1974). 
 190.  See supra Part I.B. 
 191.  Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 558. 
 192.  Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649–50 (2010). 
 193. Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 557–58. 
 194.  Id. 
 195.  Securities Act of 1933 § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (2016). 
 196.  See supra Part I.A.; see also supra Part II.A.1. 
 197.  See supra Part I.A. 
 198.  Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. ANZ Secs., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 2042, 2055 (2017). 
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B.  The Supreme Court’s Holding in California Public Employees’ 
Retirement Systems v. ANZ Securities, Inc. Should Be Read 
Broadly as Applying to All Statutes of Repose 
A plaintiff’s substantive right to file a claim against a defendant for fil-
ing a false or misleading registration statement derives from Section 11 of 
the Securities Act of 1933.199  But the Securities Act of 1933 also provides 
defendants with a substantive right to be free from liability after three years 
through Section 13’s statute of repose.200  The purpose of a statute of repose 
is to provide a defendant with a substantive right to be free from liability 
after a legislatively determined period of time.201  Because statutes of re-
pose provide defendants with a statutory, substantive right, they cannot be 
superseded by judicially enacted equitable principles.202  As a result, the 
Supreme Court’s holding in California Public Employees’ Retirement Sys-
tem v. ANZ Securities, Inc. should be read broadly as applying to all statutes 
of repose, and not just to Section 13 of the Securities Act of 1933.203 
Statutes of limitations and statutes of repose, while both setting a time 
limit on a plaintiff’s ability to file a claim, are very different provisions that 
serve diverse purposes.204  Statutes of limitations create an affirmative de-
fense for a defendant when a plaintiff does not file a claim within a certain 
period of time after the injury occurs or the harm was discovered.205  Stat-
utes of repose, on the other hand, actually eliminate a plaintiff’s cause of 
action after a specific period of time following the defendant’s last culpable 
action by providing a defendant with the substantive right to be free from 
future liability.206  Unlike a statute of limitations, a statute of repose is 
measured against the defendant’s culpable act, as opposed to the plaintiff’s 
injury.207  While a statute of limitations defines the time within which a 
plaintiff can initiate a suit, a statute of repose has nothing to do with the 
plaintiff’s injury.208  Because of this distinction, a cause of action under a 
                                                          
 199.  See supra Part I.A. 
 200.  See supra Part I.A. 
 201.  See infra notes 206–211 and accompanying text. 
 202.  See infra notes 212–221 and accompanying text.  
 203.  See infra notes 224–231 and accompanying text.  
 204.  Ma v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 597 F.3d 84, 88 n.4 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(“Statutes of repose and statutes of limitations are often confused, though they are distinct.”); see 
also supra Part I.A. 
 205.  See Ma, 597 F.3d at 88 n.4 (citing Stuart v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 158 F.3d 622, 627 (2d 
Cir. 1998)). 
 206.  Id. (citing P. Stolz Family P’ship v. Daum, 355 F.3d 92, 102–03 (2d Cir. 2004)). 
 207.  See id. (explaining that a statute of repose is “usually measured from one of the defend-
ant’s acts”). 
 208.  P. Stolz Family P’ship, 355 F.3d at 102. 
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statute of repose could be extinguished before the injury to the plaintiff 
even occurs.209 
A statute of repose outlines the amount of time the plaintiff has to 
bring suit before the defendant can be totally free of liability.210  As a result, 
a statute of repose “creates a substantive right in those protected to be free 
from liability after a legislatively-determined period of time.”211  Because a 
statute of repose creates a substantive right for defendants, generally this 
right is only subject to statutory exceptions enumerated in the statute of re-
pose itself.212  Therefore, statutes of repose are not subject to equitable con-
siderations that would abridge the defendant’s right to be free from future 
liability,213 because a statute of repose creates a statutory, substantive right 
for a defendant.  When describing the difference between statutes of limita-
tions and statutes of repose, the Second Circuit articulated: 
[S]tatutes of repose affect the underlying right, not just the reme-
dy, and thus they “run without interruption once the necessary 
triggering event has occurred, even if equitable considerations 
would warrant tolling or even if the plaintiff has not yet, or could 
not yet have, discovered that she has a cause of action.”214 
Arguably, statutes of repose are so unyielding to minimize the risk of 
error that increases as the length of time between the defendant’s action and 
the alleged injury also increases.215  Because of the increased risk of error, 
statutes of repose put an “outer limit” on a plaintiff’s right to bring a claim, 
which creates an absolute bar to claims brought after that limit.216 
The Supreme Court recently compared a statute of repose to a dis-
charge in bankruptcy: It provides “a fresh start or freedom from liability.”217  
Supplementing the idea that statutes of repose allow defendants freedom 
from liability, the legal encyclopedia Corpus Juris Secundum states that the 
substantive right a statute of repose creates sets a period of time after which 
                                                          
 209.  Id. at 103 (citing Stuart, 158 F.3d at 627). 
 210.  Id. at 102. 
 211.  Amoco Prod. Co. v. Newton Sheep Co., 85 F.3d 1464, 1472 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting 
Webb v. United States, 66 F.3d 691, 701 (4th Cir. 1995)). 
 212.  P. Stolz Family P’ship, 355 F.3d at 102 (citing 1 CALVIN W. CORMAN, LIMITATIONS & 
ACTIONS § 1.1, at 4–5 (1991)). 
 213.  Id. at 102–03. 
 214.  Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency v. UBS Americas Inc., 712 F.3d 136, 140 (2d Cir. 2013) (quot-
ing P. Stolz Family P’ship, 355 F.3d at 102–03); see also First United Methodist Church of Hy-
attsville v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 882 F.2d 862, 866 (4th Cir. 1989) (“[A] statute of repose is typically 
an absolute time limit beyond which liability no longer exists and is not tolled for any reason be-
cause to do so would upset the economic balance struck by the legislative body.” (citing Knox v. 
AC & S, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 752, 759 (S.D. Ind. 1988))). 
 215.  McCann v. Hy-Vee, Inc., 663 F.3d 926, 930 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 216.  CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175, 2182 (2014). 
 217.  Id. at 2183. 
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a defendant’s potential liability will be extinguished “and will not be tolled 
for any reason.”218  The Supreme Court has adhered to the absolute “for any 
reason” concept and has held that statutes of repose cannot even be tolled in 
extreme cases that are outside a plaintiff’s control.219  In order to protect the 
substantive right a statute of repose provides to a defendant, statutes of re-
pose cannot be subject to equitable tolling.  The tolling provision from 
American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah220 was enacted by the equitable 
powers of the Supreme Court, not by a legislatively enacted statute, and is 
therefore considered equitable tolling.221 
The Supreme Court, in California Public Employees’ Retirement Sys-
tem v. ANZ Securities, Inc., reiterated that the purpose of a statute of repose, 
designed to create complete freedom from liability to defendants, “super-
sedes the application of a tolling rule based in equity.”222  Following this 
principle, the Court stated that it did not have the authority to rewrite or ig-
nore the plain meaning of the statute of repose in Section 13 of the Securi-
ties Act of 1933.223  The Court found that statutes of repose are intended to 
provide defendants with “more certainty and reliability.”224  It found that 
this purpose is a necessity in the volatile financial marketplace where “sta-
bility and reliance are essential” to the operation of financial actors.225 
The Court concluded its opinion by stating that it did not need to con-
sider equitable principles or balance interests, because the substantive right 
provided to the defendant by the statute of repose took the case outside the 
realm of American Pipe tolling.226  The Court then summarized its final 
analysis as follows: 
The 3-year time bar in § 13 of the Securities Act is a statute of re-
pose.  Its purpose and design are to protect defendants against fu-
ture liability.  The statute displaces the traditional power of courts 
to modify statutory time limits in the name of equity.  Because 
the American Pipe tolling rule is rooted in those equitable pow-
ers, it cannot extend the 3-year period.227 
                                                          
 218.  54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 7, Westlaw (database updated Feb. 2018). 
 219.  CTS Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2183 (“Statutes of repose . . . generally may not be tolled, even 
in cases of extraordinary circumstances beyond a plaintiff’s control.”).   
 220.  414 U.S. 538 (1974). 
 221.  See supra Part II.A.2. 
 222.  Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. ANZ Secs., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 2042, 2052 (2017). 
 223.  Id. at 2053–54 (citing Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2158, 2169 
(2015)). 
 224.  Id. at 2055.  
 225.  Id. 
 226.  See id. at 2055 (stating, “the mandate of the statute of repose takes the case outside the 
bounds of the American Pipe rule”). 
 227.  Id. 
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The reasoning the Court uses to hold that American Pipe equitable 
tolling cannot apply to Section 13 is based on not only the purpose of the 
Section 13 statute of repose, but on the purpose of statutes of repose as a 
whole.228  Therefore, the analysis presented by the Court does not limit it-
self to applying only to the Securities Act of 1933. 
While not all statutes of repose apply to securities laws,229 they all 
have the same purpose of providing defendants with a total freedom from 
liability after a certain period of time.230  Because the purpose of a statute of 
repose does not change from statute to statute, the Court’s final analysis in 
this case can be applied to all statutes of repose.  By applying this analysis 
broadly, and consistently with Supreme Court precedent, statutes of repose 
cannot be subject to equitable tolling.231 
C.  Discussing the Counterargument That the Supreme Court’s 
Holding in California Public Employees’ Retirement System v. 
ANZ Securities, Inc. Should Be Read Narrowly as Only Applying to 
the Statute of Repose in Section 13, and Finding It Legally 
Unconvincing 
In her dissenting opinion in California Public Employees’ Retirement 
System v. ANZ Securities, Inc., Justice Ginsburg briefly touched on the idea 
that preventing CalPERS from recovery, despite the class action com-
plaint’s timely filing, after it opted out of the class and tried to proceed in-
dividually, contradicts FRCP 23.232  The claim that a timely filed class ac-
tion also launches timely individual actions for all class members was also 
argued in American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah.233  In American Pipe, 
the Court stated, “the filing of a timely class action complaint commences 
                                                          
 228.  Compare id. (“Its purpose and design are to protect defendants from future liability.”), 
with Amoco Prod. Co. v. Newton Sheep Co., 85 F.3d 1464, 1472 (10th Cir. 1996) (“[A] statute of 
repose . . . ‘creates a substantive right in those protected to be free from liability after a legislative-
ly-determined period of time.’” (quoting Webb v. United States, 66 F.3d 691, 700–01 (4th Cir. 
1995))). 
 229.  See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. Ann. §1-50 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.) (man-
dating that actions based on defective or unsafe conditions caused by improvements to real prop-
erty cannot be filed more than six years after the last act or omission of the defendant); MD. CODE 
Ann., CTS. & JUD. PROC., § 5-109 (West, Westlaw through ch.1&2 from 2018 Reg. Sess.) (man-
dating that in suits against healthcare providers, the suit must be filed by the earlier of five years 
after the injury was committed—the act of the defendant—or three years after the injury was dis-
covered). 
 230.  P. Stolz Family P’ship v. Daum, 355 F.3d 92, 102 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 231.  Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 363 (1991) (stat-
ing, “a period of repose [is] inconsistent with tolling”). 
 232.  137 S. Ct. 2042, 2056 (2017) (5-4 decision) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing FED. R. CIV. 
P. 23(c)(2)(B)(v)).  
 233.  414 U.S. 538 (1974).  
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the action for all members of the class.”234  American Pipe found that hold-
ing otherwise would frustrate the purpose of FRCP 23, because class ac-
tions are designed to avoid “multiplicity of activity” in the courts.235 
The Supreme Court promulgated the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
and they possess the same authority as any other law.236  However, because 
the Supreme Court prescribed these Rules, they are subject to analysis un-
der the Rules Enabling Act (“REA”).237  The REA provides that rules en-
acted by the Supreme Court “shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any sub-
stantive right.”238  When faced with issues regarding whether a Federal Rule 
might be in contention with a statutory substantive right, the Court has held 
that it will not interpret a Rule in a way that would render the Rule invalid 
under the REA so long as an alternate interpretation that preserves the 
Rule’s integrity is available.239 
This Comment need not reiterate in depth that the American Pipe 
Court was dealing with a statute of limitations, as opposed to one of re-
pose.240  But it is significant that a statute of repose, like the one in Section 
13 and unlike the statute of limitations in American Pipe, confers to the Re-
spondents a substantive right to be free from liability after three years.241  If 
the Court interpreted FRCP 23 to allow a class member’s individual claim 
to be filed with the class action complaint, and allowed the claim to proceed 
after being filed in an individual action more than three years later, the Re-
spondents’ substantive right to be free from liability after three years would 
be frustrated—and therefore “abridged” as forbidden by the REA.242  While 
FRCP 23 gives plaintiffs a substantive right to opt-out of a class action,243 
exercising this opt-out right cannot provide plaintiffs with the ability to 
override the defendant’s rights.244 
                                                          
 234.  Id. at 550.  
 235.  Id. at 551.  
 236.  4 CHARLES ALLEN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1030, 
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 237.  Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2016).  
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stantial variations [in outcomes] between state and federal litigation,’ we entirely agree.” (altera-
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The counterargument that the purpose of FRCP 23 would allow a class 
member’s individual claim to be essentially filed with the class action com-
plaint245 would frustrate the substantive right provided by a statute of re-
pose246 in violation of the REA.247 Therefore, FRCP 23 cannot convincingly 
support the argument the holding in California Public Employees’ Retire-
ment System v. ANZ Securities, Inc. should be read narrowly and should 
leave open the possibility of other statutes of repose being subject to tolling.  
As a result, the Court’s holding should be read broadly as applying to all 
statutes of repose.248 
III.  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court came to the correct conclusion in California Pub-
lic Employees’ Retirement System v. ANZ Securities, Inc., that the statute of 
repose in Section 13 of the Securities Act of 1933 is not subject to equitable 
American Pipe tolling.249  This holding should be read broadly as applying 
to all statutes of repose, not just to the one in Section 13, because statutes of 
repose provide defendants with a substantive right to be free from future li-
ability after a specified period of time.250  In fact, courts and the wider legal 
community seem already to be construing the holding in this way, with the 
Southern District of New York recently stating, “Although the ANZ case 
involved one particular statute of repose, the case’s reasoning extends to 
other statutes of repose.”251  Additionally, only five weeks after the Court’s 
holding in this case, the Third Circuit extended its reasoning to claims 
brought under Sections 10(b), 20(a), and 20A of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934.252  The Third Circuit interpreted the Court’s holding in Cali-
                                                          
 245.  Id. at 2056 (5-4 decision) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 246.  See supra Part II.B. 
 247.  See supra text accompanying notes 237–238, 242. 
 248.  See supra Part II.B. 
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(Sept. 21, 2017), (detailing the Third Circuit’s application of the rule from CalPERS to another 
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fornia Public Employees’ Retirement System as stating “the American Pipe 
tolling rule cannot be invoked to toll the running of time under the statutes 
of repose at issue.”253 
While CalPERS various arguments did not persuade the Court to apply 
American Pipe tolling to the Section 13 statute of repose, they were ulti-
mately not prevented from recovering for the improperly filed Lehman 
Brothers offerings.  After the Court’s opinion was rendered, a spokeswom-
an for CalPERS said: 
 Since the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008, CalPERS has 
recovered $28.85 million from a number of defendants involved 
with the sale of Lehman’s bonds, including the company’s audi-
tor, Lehman’s officers and directors, and several bond underwrit-
ers. . . . The amounts recovered are substantially more than we 
would have obtained had CalPERS remained in the class-action 
suit.254 
Applying the Court’s holding to all statutes of repose may seem like a 
harsh bright-line rule, but CalPERS recovery suggests otherwise.  While 
statutes of repose may bar plaintiffs from pursuing certain untimely claims, 
they may nonetheless seek alternative routes of relief.255  Ultimately, apply-
ing the Court’s holding broadly will uphold the purpose of statutes of re-
pose by allowing defendants the freedom from liability these statutes are 
designed to provide.256 
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